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Construction is a dynamic process in which the outcomes depend on the quality of the 
project team; therefore, awarding the project to the best-suited contractor an important decision 
for owners. One method of contractor procurement is the best-value (BV) approach. When using 
this approach, the owner considers contractors’ qualifications in addition to their proposed 
prices; in contrast, price is the sole criterion in traditional low-bid procurement. BV has been 
used extensively by owners in the past few decades, with the goal of selecting the best-suited 
contractor for a specific project. But little research has been conducted that justifies the use of 
BV procurement within the Design-Bid-Build (DBB) system. This study aimed to fill the gap in 
the literature by statistically identifying whether BV procurement leads to owner’s benefits. Data 
were collected from 118 construction projects that were BV procured and D-B-B delivered. The 
data included the information such as the contractors’ price proposals and qualifications (as 
assessed through technical proposals, interviews, and past performance). The data also included 
performance indicators such as owner satisfaction scores and cost and schedule overruns. All the 
projects selected for this study were public vertical projects; most were renovation projects. The 
data were analyzed through using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. The results 
indicate that employing a BV-procured contractor can be beneficial to owners in terms of cost 
and schedule performance. The findings also indicate that groups of contractors that receive high 
scores for technical proposals and interviews also achieve better project performance. Because 
BV involves potentially selecting an expensive contractor compared to the lowest bidder, an 
attempt was made to measure the cost of the selected contractor. To measure the cost, the 
concept of total BV cost was developed. The results indicate that BV-selected contractors have 
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Historically, construction contractors have been procured through low-bid methods, 
wherein owners exclusively consider price when selecting a contractor for project award 
(Kashiwagi and Savicky 2002, Yu and Wang 2012). Owners have continued to use the low-bid 
system due to the ease of identifying the lowest bidder, even though many owners are not 
satisfied with the performance of the system (Kashiwagi and Mayo 2001). Sometimes, the low- 
bid method has caused contractors to quote artificially low bids (Yasamis et al. 2002). For 
example, a contractor might submit a low bid when the contractor has a shortage of work, 
preferring a low-paying project rather than no business at all (Hatush and Skitmore 1997). 
Owners’ extensive use of low-bid procurement and their lack of knowledge about other 
procurement methods are perceived to be problems in the construction industry (Post 2000). 
Low-bid procurement can lead to poor construction performance because bidders are not inclined 
to fully understand the needs of the client (Luu et al. 2005, Post 2001). Many previous studies 
indicate that the lowest bid may not be the best bid when the final cost is taken into account 
(Wong et al. 2001, Kashiwagi and Mayo 2001). 
An increasing number of owners are becoming aware of multicriteria procurement, in 
which more than price is considered when selecting a contractor (Wong et al. 2001). Owners are 
choosing to use these procurement approaches because of the inadequate performance of low-bid 
contractors, the increasing complexity of construction design, the decreasing duration of the 
procurement phase, increasing construction costs, and litigation. One alternative approach is 
best-value (BV) procurement (Kashiwagi 2003, Kashiwagi and Savicky 2002,). 
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1.2 BV Procurement 
 
The construction industry has been gradually transitioning from using traditional low-bid 
approaches to using BV procurement methods to select contractors. BV procurement is a 
procurement method that considers cost qualifications-based aspects; the intent is to select the 
bidder that proposes the best balance between a competitive price and strong qualifications (El 
Warani et al. 2006). 
The fundamental premise of BV procurement is that the owner can achieve a more 
effective and efficient construction process by considering contractor qualifications along with 
price during the bidding process. Yet, in many organizations that buy a large volume of 
construction services, the perception exists that BV may result in larger up-front costs if the 
lowest bidder is not selected. Further, organizations may perceive that selecting the BV 
contractor may not result in end-of-project savings (which would justify larger up-front 
expenditures). Neither of these perceptions has been empirically verified in the literature. 
An owner may be willing to award a project to a non-low-bid contractor as long as the 
BV contractor has the potential to limit cost increases during construction (Scott et al. 2006). The 
ability of BV procurement to improve cost performance has not been widely examined, 
particularly for design-bid-build (D-B-B) vertical construction projects. Also, there is limited 
research on the schedule and quality performance of BV projects. Empirical research on the cost, 
schedule, and quality indicators in BV-procured projects is important in helping owners better 
assess the benefits (or lack thereof) associated with utilizing BV procurement as a replacement 
for traditional low-bid methods of selecting construction contractors. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The main objective of this study was to determine the BV cost impact at the time of 
bidding and during construction, resulting in a quantification of the overall cost impact of BV 
procurement. Data on the procurement and performance of 118 BV construction projects were 
analyzed in this study. All the projects selected for the study were public-owned, vertical 
institutional construction projects and were delivered through the D-B-B system. 
Another important objective of the study was to determine whether a statistically 
significant correlation exists between project performance (cost, schedule, and owner 
satisfaction) and the qualifications of the contractor. In addition, the performance of different 
contractor groups was analyzed to identify any significant differences between groups. 
Understanding whether any relationships exist is important because owners may be willing to 
pay more up front to maximize project performance. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 
After the research objectives were established, it was important to plan the research in 
order to obtain the desired results. The data collected from 118 construction projects were 
analyzed using descriptive and inferential analytical methods. In addition to this introductory 
chapter, this thesis contains the following chapters: 
● Chapter 2—Literature Review: This chapters contains brief summaries of 
previous studies in the areas of BV procurement and general project performance. 
This chapter identifies criteria that owners have used in BV procurement. Project 
performance is discussed in terms of cost and schedule growth percentages, 
resulting in the identification of past trends. Also, previous studies involving 
renovation projects were analyzed. 
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● Chapter 3—Research Objectives: This chapter identifies the research needs, 
objectives and the research questions and hypotheses that were addressed in this 
study. The expected research contributions are also stated in this chapter. 
● Chapter 4—Methodology: The analytical methods used in this study are described 
in this chapter. The chapter also presents the data collection process and 
definitions of the variables examined in this study. 
● Chapter 5—Results: This chapter presents the important results from analyzing 
the data collected in the study. 
● Chapter 6—Discussion: In this chapter, the analysis results and their importance 
are discussed. 
● Chapter 7—Conclusion: This chapter provides conclusions regarding the results 
and summarizes the major takeaways. 
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Historically, construction projects have typically been procured through the low-bid 
selection process. Owners have begun to adopt other selection methods, such as the multicriteria 
approach, in order to achieve better project performance. This chapter contains a review of past 
studies on low-bid procurement and the evolution of BV procurement. The literature review also 
discusses research on project performance in terms of cost and schedule, including in BV 
projects and renovation projects. 
2.2 Low-Bid Procurement 
 
In the last few decades, many new procurement methods and delivery systems have been 
developed. Nevertheless, low-bid procurement has remained the most popular method 
(Kashiwagi et al. 2004). In this system, selection is based solely on the price presented in 
contractors’ bids (Molenaar et al. 2014). Contractors develop detailed bids after carefully 
reviewing the complete (or nearly complete) set of plans and specifications; the goal is for the 
bidders to propose to construct the project for the lowest possible cost. The bid with the lowest 
price proposal is automatically awarded the project. 
Some owners believe that low-bid procurement gives the best incentive to keep costs 
down (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). This selection method has been used particularly in public 
projects, for which the selection process must be transparent and unbiased (Falagario et al. 2012, 
Kashiwagi et al. 2014). According to Gransberg and Ellicot (1997), low-bid procurement 
simplifies bid preparation and review, and it limits the likelihood that bidders will protest the 
award decision because the lowest bidder is the clear winner. 
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The low-bid process has many drawbacks because only price-related factors are 
considered in contractor selection. This procurement process can lead to huge cost overruns and 
schedule growth (Illia 2001). Further, owners cannot balance quality and cost factors, including 
ease of operation, when selecting contractors through low-bid procurement (Markus 1997). In 
this system, the contract between the owner and contractor does not address the quality and 
timeliness of the construction process (Gransberg and Ellicot 1997). Achieving the lowest final 
cost possible becomes the major focus, potentially resulting in an extended construction duration 
and lower quality. The complexity and risk involved in low-bid procurement can also result in 
misunderstandings, reactive contractor behavior, and hostile relationships (Kashiwagi et al. 
2010). 
 
2.3 BV Procurement 
 
Because of underperformance in low-bid projects, owners may adopt alternate 
procurement methods, such as BV and qualification-based selection. These methods consider 
price as well as nonprice factors, such as time, quality, and local content (Rankin et al. 1996; 
Minnesota Department of Transportation [MnDOT 2012]; Gransberg and Senadheera 1999). BV 
procurement is often described as a method of obtaining the highest value for the money 
(Schottle and Arroyo 2017). Scott et al. (2006) defined BV as a “procurement process where 
price and other key factors are considered in the evaluation and selection process to enhance the 
long-term performance and value of construction.” The BV approach creates a win-win scenario 
for the client and the contractor, maximizing the project value at the lowest possible cost and 
with minimal cost and schedule overruns (Kashiwagi et al. 2012). 
BV procurement is advantageous to owners in various ways. For example, the system 
enables owners to consider the project-specific expertise of contractors, which in turn helps 
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owners manage risks and minimize costs (Kashiwagi and Byfield 2002). Also, this method 
emphasizes quality, efficiency, and maximum value in terms of money and performance 
(Akintoye et al. 2003). The Taiwan Ministry of Justice (2009) reported that BV projects have 
higher contracted values than do low-bid projects. BV procurement has a potential to reduce 
overall cost and project duration because the contractor must develop detailed project and 
procurement plans in the early stages of the project (Gransberg and Ellicott 1997). Additionally, 
with this method, owners examine various factors that need to be considered to enrich long-term 
performance (Chan et al., 2004). 
Gransberg and Ellicot (1997) stated that a disadvantage of BV procurement is that the 
process is complicated. Further, the method can increase the effort and time required to prepare a 
solicitation package. There is also a greater likelihood that bidders will protest the award 
decision and, consequently, that the contract award will be delayed. 
Previous research on BV was thoroughly reviewed, with a focus on contractor evaluation 
criteria, multicriteria decision-making, and BV project performance. Owners have considered 
various contractor qualifications when using BV procurement. The qualifications were used as 
part of various decision-making tools to identify the most valuable contractor. The literature 
regarding evaluation criteria was studied to identify the most common evaluation criteria used by 
the owners. The literature review also included studies regarding the techniques that owners use 
to identify the best contractor. Finally, studies on BV project performance were analyzed to 
identify trends in project performance. 
2.3.1 Evaluation Criteria 
 
While procuring BV projects, owners request a variety of information from the bidders, 
such as regarding qualifications, technical proposals, and price proposals (Bamberger and Stark 
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2008). The qualifications can be objective or subjective. The rest of this section discusses key 
studies on the use and effectiveness of various BV evaluation criteria. 
Bubshait and Al-Gobali (1996) studied criteria that were considered in the 
prequalification practices for semipublic and private projects in Saudi Arabia. Data were 
collected by examining the prequalification practices of 19 large companies and through sending 
a questionnaire to 202 randomly selected companies. The responses were analyzed using an 
impact index and rank-order techniques. The researchers concluded that the most common 
evaluation criteria were contractor experience, financial stability, past performance, project 
management capabilities, availability of management staff, and contractor project capacity. The 
researchers compared these results with criteria used in the United States and found that the 
prequalification criteria are similar in both countries. 
Russell and Skibniewski (1987) identified that the characteristics of the decision-maker 
and the characteristics of the contractor are key factors in selecting a contractor. This study 
involved interviews with construction professionals, including owners, construction managers, 
architects, and personnel in surety companies that perform prequalification tasks. The results 
indicate that the following factors were considered when deciding which contractor was the best 
for a project: the type of company the participant worked at, projects that had been completed, 
current balance sheet information, projects currently under construction, the experience of key 
personnel, and references. 
According to Gransberg and Ellicot (1997), the evaluation criteria in BV procurement 
can be quantifiable or nonquantifiable. The criteria can include technical excellence, 
management capability, financial status, personnel qualifications, relevant experience, past 
performance, optional features offered, proposed completion date, and organizational risk. 
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Hasnain and Thaheem (2016) reviewed the literature to identify evaluation criteria used 
in BV procurement. Based on the literature, the researches presented a framework containing 
eight important factors: cost, risk, performance, quality control, health and safety, project 
control, delays, and current workload. Hasnain and Thaheem also proposed how ranking the 
factors can influence the selection of a contractor. 
According to Scott et al. (2006), important BV parameters include cost, time, 
qualifications, quality, and design alternatives. Ojiako et al. (2014) conducted a study to explore 
BV procurement in public building construction in Korea. The investigators sent a questionnaire 
to six experts in a public-sector stakeholder group. The results indicate that important factors 
include serviceability, safety, comfort, environmental impact, economic feasibility, and artistry. 
Based on using an analytic process to weight the criteria, the researchers concluded that using 
these criteria leads to the best results when procuring contractors for public construction projects. 
Russell et al. (1992) analyzed 10 questionnaire items sent to public owners, private 
owners, and construction managers. The results indicate that the major factors in selecting a 
contractor are financial stability, availability of key personnel, relevant experience, and past 
performance. 
Doloi (2009) sent a questionnaire to 155 project managers, contract administrators, 
design managers, and clients in Australia to determine the influence of the attributes on the 
decision-making process. Through analyzing the responses, the investigator identified 43 
influential attributes to use in prequalifying contractors. After performing factor analysis on 
these attributes, Doloi determined that the most significant are the soundness of the business and 
the workforce, planning and control, quality management, past performance, risk management, 
organizational capability, and commitment. After preforming multiple linear regression, the 
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author concluded that technical expertise, past success, time in business, work methods, and 
working capital have a significant relationship with contractors’ performance in terms of time, 
cost, and quality. 
BV elements can be objective or subjective, according to Gransberg and Shane (2015). 
The researchers reported that objective elements include contractors’ project experience, timely 
completion of the projects, compliance with material specifications, workmanship, safety record, 
and accuracy of submittals. Subjective elements include subcontractor management, training and 
employee development programs, corporate commitment to achieving customer satisfaction, and 
clients. In this research 36 construction projects for 26 public transportation agencies in 14 states 
were analyzed. The researchers concluded that nonprice factors are more important than price 
factors and should therefore carry greater weight in evaluation plans. Also, as an agency’s 
experience increases, the weight of the price factor decreases. 
The MnDOT used design-build (D-B) project delivery in conjunction with a two-step BV 
procurement method in the construction of an additional lane on either side of a well-traveled 
arterial highway (Shane et al. 2006). MnDOT required that bidders provide information 
regarding the following: organization and experience, key personnel, project understanding, 
project approach, project management, and legal and financial qualifications. The MnDOT 
completed 30% of the design and then required the selected contractor to finish the design and to 
construct the road. During the bidding phase, the MnDOT issued a request for qualifications in 
the first step and a request for proposals (RFPs) in the second step. 
According to Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy (2000), a contractor should be evaluated 
and selected based on its capabilities, relevant experience, and qualifications, not merely on 
price. These researchers focused on developing a model for contractor prequalification and bid 
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evaluation in D-B projects. The researchers identified the following criteria for selecting 
contractors: understanding of the project, design and construction approach, delivery of work, 
management of the services, qualifications and experience, and costs. The researchers proposed 
an effective model to procure contractors for D-B projects without analyzing the performance of 
projects procured using this method. 
Alsugair (1999) conducted interviews with experts from private companies, public 
establishments, and banks to identify evaluation criteria. The experts discussed 36 factors, which 
Alsugair grouped into nine categories: financial evaluation of bid; understanding of bid, project 
location, contractor qualifications, completeness of bid document, relevant experience and 
reputation of the contractor, the contractor’s organization, submission of alternative offers, and 
foreign companies. The researcher developed a framework for selecting contractors; in this 
framework, each criterion is assigned a weight according to importance. The study did not 
examine the overall project performance of the selected contractors. 
Gransberg and Molenaar (2004) analyzed 78 RFPs to classify current approaches to 
evaluating quality in public D-B construction. The selected RFPs came from public vertical and 
horizontal projects, such as residential, commercial, industrial, highway, bridge, rail/light, and 
rail/transit. Six general approaches to examining D-B quality requirements were identified— 
namely, by examining qualifications, programs, specified programs, performance criteria, 
specifications, and warranty. 
The benefits that federal owners seek when using the D-B process were identified by 
Gransberg and Barton (2007), who analyzed 110 RFPs. The RFPs were collected from 11 federal 
agencies, and the projects regarded housing, schools, office buildings, renovation, technical 
facilities, technical systems, and indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity work. In this study, the 
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evaluation criteria were organized into the following categories: price, technical, qualifications, 
schedule, and project management. The results were compared to the findings of a 1996 study, 
with the goal of identifying any correlations between owner attitudes and selection criteria. 
Gransberg and Barton concluded that a typical federal agency prefers to select a well-qualified 
D-B team with a low bid. 
2.3.2 Multicriteria Decision-Making 
 
Selecting the right contractor for a project is a crucial decision for a project owner (Singh 
and Tiong 2006). In recent years, increased project complexity, higher performance, and 
financial and safety requirements have led to the use of multicriteria decision-making methods 
(Cristobal 2012). Multicriteria decision-making involves making decisions through considering 
multiple, usually conflicting, criteria (Xu and Yang 2001). According to Chaphalkar and Shirke 
(2013), research on multicriteria decision-making is an advanced field of operations research that 
is devoted to the development and implementation of tools and methodologies to aid in solving 
complex problems involving multiple criteria and goals. In project procurement, multicriteria 
decision-making involves considering various contractor qualifications and other criteria to 
effectively determine the best contractor for a project. Researchers have analyzed various 
multicriteria decision-making models in contractor selection; some of these models are 
summarized in this section. 
In recent years, some owners have shifted from using low-bid procurement to 
multicriteria procurement (Wong et al. 2010). Two multicriteria decision-making methods— 
TOPSIS (technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution) and VIKOR 
(vlsekriterijumska optimizacija I kompromisno resenje) were studied by Cristobal (2012). The 
researcher found that these methods are effective tools for selecting contractors based on 
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multiple factors and the owner’s expectations. When both these methods were employed to select 
a contractor for a road construction project in Spain in 2002, the results were the same regarding 
which bidder received the highest ranking. Cristobal concluded that being highest ranked 
according to the TOPSIS method implies that the contractor is the best in terms of ranking index, 
whereas being highest ranked according to the VIKOR method implies that the contractor is the 
closest to having the ideal solution. 
Balubaid and Alamoudi (2015) used the analytical hierarchy process to determine the 
relative importance of the following evaluation criteria: financial capability, past performance, 
relevant experience, resources, current workload, and safety performance. Interviews and 
meetings were held with senior project engineers, project managers, contract advisors, and 
project controllers to rank the criteria according to their importance. The collected data were 
analyzed using the analytical hierarchy process, and the findings indicate that the process can be 
used in contractor procurement to determine crucial criteria to use when selecting a contractor. 
In another study, Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila (2012) used the fuzzy set theory to evaluate 
the selection criteria of technical capacity, relevant experience, management capability, financial 
stability, past performance, past relationships, reputation, and occupational health and safety. 
Fuzzy set theory uses of an algorithm to address the inconsistencies in the fuzzy preference 
relation when pairwise comparisons are used. Fuzzy set theory can also be used to linguistically 
assess the performance of contractors based on qualitative and quantitative criteria. After 
developing a model, Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Villa applied it to a rehabilitation project for a 
building at the Technical University of Cartagena. The researchers concluded that fuzzy set 
theory is an adequate tool to use with imprecise and uncertain problems; in particular, these 
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problems can be addressed through using variables with values that are words or sentences in 
natural language, rather than values that are numbers. 
2.3.3 Performance of BV Procured Projects 
 
Several studies have reported the benefits of BV procurement to owners and contractors. 
 
Researchers have quantified the advantages of BV procurement in terms of cost and schedule. 
This section summarizes the studies that quantify the benefits of BV selection. 
Hilger (2009) reported that MnDOT successfully developed and used BV procurement 
for a D-B project (MnROC 52) in Rochester, Minnesota. The author’s aim was to study BV 
selection in the state after the collapse of the I-35 bridge. To do so, Hilger examined the 
method’s use in public agencies such as the Minnesota Department of Administration, the 
MnDOT, the University of Minnesota Capital Planning and Project Management Group, and the 
South Washington County School District, as well as agencies in Roseville, Eagan, and other 
cities and in counties. The MnROC 52 project was successful in that the contractor completed 
the project two years earlier than anticipated. The contractor saved $36 million in road-user 
costs, which were set at $50,000 per day at the time of project award. In 2007, BV was also used 
to procure a contractor to reconstruct the I-35 bridge. The bridge was successfully built in a very 
short time, which resulted in a great benefit to the contractor. In contrast, a similar reconstruction 
project (for Wakota Bridge) was not successful. A different procurement method was used, and 
the project was delivered using traditional D-B-B. Major design errors resulted in the project’s 
failure. Hilger concluded that owners are highly satisfied with BV-procured contractors. The 
study only examined the performance of BV-procured projects in Minnesota, without 
considering the qualifications of contractors. 
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Migliaccio et al. (2010) compared the performance of projects procured using the low- 
bid, BV, and adjusted-bid methods. The data in this study consisted of procurement and 
performance information for 146 transportation projects delivered using the D-B method. The 
aim of the research was to determine the differences in project performance in terms of cost and 
schedule growth based on the length of the procurement process. Using statistical methods, the 
researchers found a strong linear correlation between schedule growth and procurement duration. 
In the research, BV-procured projects experienced cost increases of −1.5% and schedule growth 
of 12%, on average, whereas low-bid projects had average cost increases and schedule growth of 
3.1% and 11%, respectively. 
Contractors receive more benefits from BV projects than from low-bid projects, 
according to a study by Sullivan and Guo (2009). The researchers developed a questionnaire 
regarding 13 cash flow risks, with the goal of studying the effects of BV on project cash-flow 
risks and contractor profitability. Survey responses were obtained from 26 contractors who built 
BV-selected projects (11%) and low-bid-selected projects (44%) projects, along with 
prequalified and negotiated bids, in Arizona, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Texas. The projects 
delivered by the contractors used D-B-B, D-B, CMAR (construction manager at risk), and other 
delivery systems, with the majority being D-B-B (63%). The survey results show that BV 
procurement has a greater effect on cash-flow risks and contractors’ profit in BV projects (8%) 
than in low-bid projects (2%). 
El Wardani et al. (2006) compared the performance of sole-source, qualifications-based, 
BV, and low-bid procured D-B projects. Survey data were collected regarding 76 D-B projects in 
the United States. The goal of this research was to determine whether correlations exist between 
(a) the procurement method used in D-B projects and (b) the performance metrics of cost, time, 
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and quality. The researchers concluded that performance was better in projects that involved 
qualifications-based procurement than in projects with other procurement methods. The cost 
growth in the BV-procured projects was 2.5%, whereas the cost growth in the low-bid projects 
was 7.3%. The schedule growth was 1.0% for BV projects, compared to 14.8% for BV low-bid 
projects. 
2.4 Overall Construction-Project Performance 
 
Construction projects have experienced a wide range of performance outcomes related to 
cost, schedule, and quality. Researchers have quantified project performance in various types of 
project. This literature review focused on performance data in D-B-B projects and projects in the 
public, vertical institutional sector. 
Pocock et al. (1996) considered a number of contract modifications to cost and schedule 
as indicators of project performance. Cost and schedule are the most common project- 
performance indicators (Francom et al. 2016). Many researchers have also considered quality as 
a project-performance metric (El Wardani et al. 2006, Migliaccio et al. 2010; Bogus et al. 2013). 
Kochar and Sanvido (1998) collected performance data on 351 building projects; 33% of 
the projects were D-B-B, 44% were D-B; and 23% were CMAR. The investigators found that the 
average cost growth of projects that were delivered through the D-B-B method was 9%, and the 
schedule growth was around 11 %. In another study, Hale et al. (2011) collected and analyzed 
data on 39 D-B-B projects and 38 D-B projects for the US Navy Bachelor Enlisted Quarters. The 
mean cost growth of D-B-B projects was around 4%, and the mean schedule growth of those 
projects was around 15%. 
Data from 25 public-sector projects were analyzed by Pocock et al. (1996) to examine the 
relationship between project interaction and project performance. The average cost growth of 
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traditionally delivered projects was 12.9%, and these projects had a schedule growth of 41.2%. 
In research by Col Debella and Ries (2006), the cost growth was 4.5% and the schedule growth 
was 1.3%. The researchers collected data regarding projects in public school districts in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Virginia. 
Ibbs et al. (2003) analyzed 67 global projects to compare D-B-B, D-B, and other project 
delivery systems regarding the magnitude and frequency of cost and schedule changes. The 
average cost growth of D-B-B projects was −0.4%, whereas the average schedule growth was 
8.4%. Allen (2001) compared the cost, schedule, and quality indicators of 110 military 
construction projects delivered through D-B and D-B-B. The results show that the horizontal 
construction projects delivered through the D-B-B method had a cost growth of 24.6% and a 
schedule growth of 58%. Vertical projects delivered through the same method experienced a cost 
growth of 17.1% and a schedule growth of 30%. 
In another study, Minchin et al. (2013) analyzed data from 60 Florida Department of 
Transportation projects; 30 were D-B-B, and the other 30 were D-B. The average cost growth 
was 20.4%, and the average schedule growth was 23.0% for projects that were delivered using 
the D-B-B method. Uhlik and Eller (1999) analyzed the performance of eight military medical 
construction projects, with the goal of identifying the advantages of using alternative project 
delivery methods instead of the traditional D-B-B method. The researchers found that the 
average cost overrun was 12.93%. 
2.5 Performance in Renovation Projects 
 
Between 1992 and 2007, the expenditure on renovation projects increased from $20 
billion to $120 billion in commercial and institutional sectors. Typically, it is more economically 
feasible for an owner to renovate a structure than to replace it (Singh et al. 2014). There is a need 
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to understand the performance of renovation projects because their importance has been 
increasing rapidly. 
Associates from 10 construction companies were interviewed by Singh et al. (2014) to 
identify production management practices in renovation projects. The investigators concluded 
that despite the uncertainty involved in renovation projects, there are no differences in the 
performance assessment methods for new and renovation construction projects. 
McKim et al. (2000) compared the performance of new and renovation projects 
performance. The researchers used a questionnaire to obtain data on 25 reconstruction and 15 
new construction projects, after which the researchers interviewed project participants. The 
findings indicate that new construction projects have better cost and schedule performance than 
do reconstruction projects. 
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This chapter describes the point of departure from the existing literature, provides the 
study’s research objectives and research question, presents corresponding hypothesis statements, 
and describes the expected contribution of this research. To summarize the point of departure, 
the traditional D-B-B delivery system has historically been associated with low-bid procurement, 
wherein owners use price as their sole evaluation criterion and award projects to the lowest 
responsible bidder. The use of alternative procurement methods, such as BV, has become 
increasingly common in the construction industry. Although BV procurement of construction 
services is most common in projects with alternative delivery methods, such as D-B and CMAR, 
BV procurement is also being be used in D-B-B projects. Because this trend is relatively new, 
little research has explicitly focused on the application of BV procurement methods in D-B-B 
projects. 
This study aimed to address this gap by collecting data on D-B-B projects that were 
procured through the BV method. The data were then analyzed to identify whether a relationship 
existed between BV procurement and contractor performance during the project’s construction 
phase. 
Three research objectives and one question were developed related to BV-procured D-B- 
B projects. The first objective regarded the cost implications of BV for owners during the 
procurement phase. The second objective concerned performance indicators during the 
construction phase. The third objective regarded the total cost implications for owners of using 
the BV procurement method in D-B-B projects. The research question involved examining the 
relationship between the qualifications that contractors demonstrated during the procurement 
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phase and the contractors’ performance during the construction phase. For the research question, 
this study hypothesized that selecting contractors with greater qualifications would result in 
performance improvements during the construction phase. 
3.2 Point of Departure 
 
This research was conducted because of the limited number of studies analyzing the 
construction projects are procured using the BV method and are delivered using D-B-B. Most of 
the previous research on BV procurement was focused on alternate project delivery methods, 
such as D-B and CMAR. In these studies, the projects’ performance outcomes were rarely 
considered in relation to the procurement phase. Further, most of the research on BV 
procurement examined horizontal projects, such as highways, rather than on vertical projects, 
such as buildings. Also, renovation construction has not been explored as much as new 
construction has. 
Various procurement methods and delivery systems have been adopted and adapted to 
increase the effectiveness of the construction process. However, due to constraints such as 
government regulations, delivery methods such as D-B are used infrequently in some states; 
public owners have been forced to use D-B-B to deliver most of their projects, regardless of the 
procurement method used. It is important to analyze BV-procured, D-B-B-delivered projects in 
order to identify their performance, because this type of project could benefit public owners that 
must use D-B-B delivery. However, few studies have analyzed BV and D-B-B together. Also, 
there are minimal studies on vertical projects using BV procurement and D-B-B delivery. 
Previous research has typically examined preconstruction procurement phases and project 
performance during the construction phase separately. It is important for owners to understand 
the correlation between procurement method and project performance. Some researchers have 
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quantified the relationships between procurement or delivery methods and performance. But few 
studies have examined both procurement methods and delivery methods in relation to project 
performance. This gap was addressed in the current study. 
This study compared BV procured projects with low-bid projects in terms of overall cost 
and schedule. With BV procurement, the owner considers contractor qualifications in addition to 
financial proposals, with the goal of improving project performance by minimized cost overruns 
and schedule growth. For instance, a contractor with better qualifications may bid a higher price, 
but the owner would expect better construction execution than the lowest bidder would provide. 
The awarded contractor has to outperform the lowest bidder in terms of cost and schedule 
management. This idea has not been analyzed in previous quantitative studies. This study 
attempts to address this gap in the literature by comparing BV-procured projects with low-bid 
projects. 
3.3 Research Objectives 
 
The research objectives of this study can be summarized as follows. 
 
● Research Objective 1: At the time of bid submission, what are the cost 
implications of BV procurement compared with low-bid procurement? In other 
words, how much more expensive is BV procurement than the lowest bid? 
● Research Objective 2: At project completion, what is the overall performance of 
BV-procured contractors in terms of cost, schedule, and owner satisfaction? 
● Research Objective 3: What is the total cost of BV-procured projects (BV 
premium plus cost growth) compared with an idealized low-bid project that has 
no cost growth? 
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3.4 Research Question 
 
The key research question for this study is as follows. 
 
● Research Question 1: In BV-procured projects, what is the relationship between 
the awarded contractor’s qualifications and performance during the construction 
phase? 
3.5 Hypothesis Statements 
 
Based on the research design and nature of data collection, results for research objectives 
1, 2, and 3 were investigated using descriptive analytical methods; therefore, no formal 
hypothesis statements were established for the question. For research question 1, three 
hypothesis statements were developed and then tested using inferential statistical methods. Each 
hypothesis was divided into three statements to accurately describe the hypothesis test in relation 
to the three dependent variables regarding project performance. 
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
● Hypothesis 1a (H1.a): Awarded contractors with higher technical-proposal 
evaluation scores achieve lower cost growth than do awarded contractors with 
lower technical-proposal evaluation scores. 
● Hypothesis 1b (H1.b): Awarded contractors with higher technical-proposal 
evaluation scores achieve lower schedule growth than do awarded contractors 
with lower technical-proposal evaluation scores. 
● Hypothesis 1c (H1.c): Awarded contractors with higher technical-proposal 
evaluation scores achieve higher owner satisfaction than do awarded contractors 
with lower technical-proposal evaluation scores. 
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3.5.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
● Hypothesis 2a (H2.a): Awarded contractors with higher past-performance 
evaluation scores achieve lower cost growth than do awarded contractors with 
lower past-performance evaluation scores. 
● Hypothesis 2b (H2.b): Awarded contractors with higher past-performance 
evaluation scores achieve lower schedule growth than do awarded contractors 
with lower past-performance evaluation scores. 
● Hypothesis 2c (H2.c): Awarded contractors with higher past-performance 
evaluation scores achieve higher owner satisfaction than do awarded contractors 
with lower past-performance evaluation scores. 
3.5.3 Hypothesis 3 
 
● Hypothesis 3a (H3.a): Awarded contractors with higher interview-evaluation 
scores achieve lower cost growth than do awarded contractors with lower 
interview-evaluation scores. 
● Hypothesis 3b (H3.b): Awarded contractors with higher interview-evaluation 
scores achieve lower schedule growth than do awarded contractors with lower 
interview-evaluation scores. 
● Hypothesis 3c (H3.c): Awarded contractors with higher interview evaluation 
scores achieve higher owner satisfaction than do awarded contractors with lower 
interview evaluation scores. 
3.6 Expected Research Contributions 
 
The research was expected to make several contributions. First, the study quantified the 
performance of BV-procured contracts both at the time of contract award and at the time of 
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project completion. Examining these two points in the construction project lifecycle enabled the 
researcher to link BV-procurement decisions with end-of-project cost and schedule performance. 
The study also quantified the amount beyond the lowest-bid alternative that was incurred at the 
time of contract award. Consequently, the study identified the upfront cost implications of 
selecting contractors with greater expertise. The study also identified the overall cost savings 
realized by using BV procurement instead of low-bid procurement. 
Further, this study related the qualifications of awarded contractors (as assessed by owner 
evaluation scores during the procurement phase) with the contractor’s construction-phase 
performance. This information can aid industry practitioners in understanding which 
qualifications-based evaluation criteria are indicators of construction-phase performance. As a 
result, owners will be better able to improve their BV-procurement procedures, such as by 
prioritizing the weights of qualifications-based evaluation criteria that are linked with project 
performance improvements. 
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The methodology that was adopted for this research relates procurement methods and 
performance in D-B-B projects. Data from 541 construction projects completed in the last ten 
years were collected for this study. Because the scope of this research was limited to BV- 
procured, D-B-B projects, the data set was narrowed to 118 relevant projects. The data included 
project documents, such as evaluation matrices, project records, and project closeout reports. 
Data included contractor qualifications that were considered during procurement, as well as the 
roles of project participants in construction performance. This chapter provides detailed 
information about the research methodology and data collection process for the study. 
4.2 Data Collection 
 
Various project documents were collected for this study. The documents included RFPs, 
matrices used to evaluate potential contractors, records of all the change orders and their impacts, 
and project closeout reports regarding owners’ satisfaction. The data came from 541 projects 
completed over the past decade for public owners in the United States and Canada. 
The overall data set was filtered so that only projects that were BV procured and D-B-B 
delivered were included in the study. Data were excluded if they regarded low-bid, D-B, or 
CMAR projects. Further, horizontal projects were also removed from the data set. Finally, only 
public-owned institutional projects were included in the final data set. Figure 4.1 shows the 




Figure 4.1: Location of Participating Owner Organizations 
 
This filtering process resulted in 118 projects being included in the study. The final 
dataset included projects for public owners such as universities, schools, state departments of 
transportation, city governments, county governments, the federal government, and public 
utilities. Table 4.1 shows the number of projects from each type of owner. 
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Table 4.1: Classification of Projects by Type of Public Institutional Owner Organization 
 
Type    Owners   Projects  
# % # % 
Public university 3 23.1 70 59.3 
Public school 2 15.4 32 27.1 
State department of transportation 2 15.4 2 1.7 
City council 1 7.7 6 5.1 
Federal government 1 7.7 1 0.8 
County 2 15.4 5 4.2 
Public utility 2 15.4 2 1.7 
Total 13  118  
 
 
The projects varied in terms of the category of work. As shown in Table 4.2, the majority 
of projects were general construction. The remaining categories included mechanical, electrical, 
and specialty construction (e.g., roofing and masonry). The projects were conducted in facilities 
with similar functional uses, such as classrooms, laboratories, and office spaces. As shown in 




Table 4.2: Classification of Projects according to Prime Contractor Scope 
 
Scope # projects % projects 
General contractor 71 60.17 
Mechanical contractor 20 16.95 
Electrical contractor 19 16.10 




Figure 4.2: Classification of Projects According to Type of Construction 
 
Table 4.3 summarizes the characteristics of the 118 projects. The total awarded cost was 
 
$164,643,990. The mean awarded cost and standard deviation were $1,395,288 and $3,546,658, 
respectively. The projects had a total awarded schedule of 17,356 days. The mean awarded 
schedule was 147 days, with a standard deviation of 113 days. 
Table 4.3: Summary of Project Characteristics 
 
Category # 
Total number of projects 118 
Cost characteristics  
Total awarded cost $164,643,990 
Mean awarded cost $1,395,288 
Median awarded cost $394,650 
Std. dev. of awarded cost $3,546,658 
Maximum awarded cost $25,987,230 
Minimum awarded cost $22,500 
Schedule characteristics  
Total awarded schedule 17,356 days 
Mean awarded schedule 147 days 
Median awarded schedule 116 days 
Std. dev. of awarded schedule 113 days 
Maximum awarded schedule 519 days 

















4.3 BV Procurement Procedures within the Dataset 
 
The data set used in this study was designed based on the evaluation matrices the project 
owners used to evaluate potential contractors. The owners’ matrices were similar in nature; there 
were subtle variations based on the nature of the projects. The most commonly used evaluation 
criteria were used as variables for analysis in this study. 
4.3.1 Evaluation Criteria 
 
In this study, the term evaluation criteria refers to the criteria that owners used to procure 
contractors through the BV method. The criteria that are included in the evaluation matrix 
depend on the project needs (Beard et al. 2001; Tenah 2001). At the start of the selection process, 
the owner identifies criteria and their relative importance; the owner then publishes this 
information in the Request for Qualifications and the RFP (Bamberger and Stark 2008). 
Several criteria were used to evaluate contractors in the projects examined in this study. 
 
Aside from the financial proposal, the most common qualification criteria were technical 
proposals, past performance, interviews, and schedule proposals. Not all of these criteria were 
used in every project. Criteria considered in fewer projects included a seat sample for a theatre 
seating renovation project, a wall systems proposal for a demountable wall systems project, and a 
roof warranty for a roofing project. Only the most frequently used criteria were selected as 
variables to analyze in this study. 
4.3.2 Evaluation Weights 
 
In the evaluation matrices, each evaluation criterion was assigned a weight, according to 
the criterion’s importance compared to other criteria in the evaluation matrix. The weight of each 
criterion is discussed in the following section. 
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4.4 Independent Variables 
 
The most commonly used criteria in evaluation matrices were selected as independent 
variables for this study. They regard the awarded contractors’ cost and schedule proposals, as 
well as the contractors’ qualifications scores. Specifically, the independent variables are financial 
proposal, technical proposal, past performance, interviews, and schedule proposal. 
4.4.1 Financial Proposal 
 
The financial proposal is the total dollar amount the contractor proposed for the project at 
the time of bidding. This variable was one of the most frequently considered selection criteria. 
When responding to owners’ RFPs, contractors include the amount they must be paid if they are 
awarded the project. A contractor calculates this amount by estimating direct project costs and 
including other compensations and fees that are necessary to finish the project. Cost bids were 
converted into a percentage-based evaluation score measured on a scale of 0%–100%. The 
owner’s evaluation committee assigned a 100% evaluation score to the lowest-bidding 
contractor. Other contractors received linearly prorated scores based on the percent differential 
between their bids and the lowest bid. 
4.4.2 Technical Proposal 
 
Contractors were required to submit technical proposals explaining their project 
management plans based on the scope indicated in the project’s construction drawings and 
specifications. Contractors were also asked to provide initial risk assessments, identifying factors 
that might cause deviations in the budget, schedule, or quality during the construction phase. 
After identifying potential risks, the contractors recommended how to mitigate each risk. Finally, 
the contractors provided value engineering feedback that might benefit the project. The owner’s 
evaluation committee assigned each contractor’s technical proposal an evaluation score of 0%– 
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100%. The technical proposal score for each awarded contractor was used as the independent 
variable for Hypothesis 1. 
4.4.3 Past Performance 
 
The past performance of a contractor is a key indicator of future performance (Steyaert 
1997). As part of the RFP, each contractor was asked to provide information about the contractor 
team’s previous project performance. The contractor team usually includes the prime/general 
contractor and any subcontractors. At the end of each project, the owner rates the performance of 
the prime contractor and any subcontractors, usually on a scale of 0–100%, with 100% meaning 
“excellent.” Contractors may use these ratings as a past-performance index when bidding on new 




The majority of projects included interviews as an evaluation criterion. The interview 
criterion was designed to evaluate each contractor’s project team members. The team members 
interviewed most commonly included the project manager, site superintendent, and lead 
members of critical subcontract teams (e.g., lead mechanical contractor or lead electrical 
contractor). The owner’s evaluation committee assigned each contractor’s project team a score of 
0–100%. The interview evaluation scores for awarded contractors were used as the independent 
variable for Hypothesis 3. 
4.4.5 Schedule Proposal 
 
Some owners asked for contractors’ proposed schedules. Specifically, the contractors 
were asked to identify the number of days required to finish the project. These days were 
assigned scores for ease of comparing the contractors. For each project, the contractor that 
32  
proposed the fewest number of days was given a score of 100%, and all competitors received a 
linearly prorated score based on the percent differential from the shortest proposed schedule 
duration. 
4.4.6 Evaluation Matrices 
 
The owners altered evaluation matrices according to project needs. The evaluation 
criteria were given different weightings based on importance. The frequency with which criteria 
were included in evaluation matrices is summarized in Table 4.4. 
 
 














Frequency 100.00% 100.00% 99.15% 55.08% 64.41% 45.76% 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows descriptive statistics regarding the criteria in the evaluation matrices. 
Owners assigned the financial proposal a weight of 24.85%, on average. It had a maximum 
weight of 39.68% and a minimum weight of 10.00%. The technical proposal had the highest 
average weight (mean = 34.12%) among all the evaluation criteria, with a maximum weight of 
45.00% and a minimum weight of 3.41%. Interviews were used 55.08% of time, as shown in 
Table 4.4, but had an average weight of 29.04%. Infrequently used project-specific criteria were 
given a weighting of 9.53% on average, with a maximum of 30.00% and a minimum of 0.77%. 
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Mean 24.85% 34.12% 15.39% 29.04% 8.40% 9.53% 
Median 25.00% 35.00% 15.00% 30.00% 7.07% 10.00% 
Mode 20.00% 35.00% 5.00% 30.00% 5.00% 10.00% 
Maximum 39.68% 47.63% 45.00% 40.00% 20.04% 30.00% 
Minimum 10.00% 10.00% 3.41% 10.00% 2.50% 0.77% 
Std. dev. 4.95% 6.51% 9.69% 5.98% 4.05% 3.99% 
 
 
4.5 Construction Phase Performance Indicators 
 
For any construction project, the overall performance can be summarized by looking at 
the project performance indicators. Because one of the main objectives of this study was to relate 
procurement to construction performance, the study involved identifying performance indicators. 
For each project in the dataset, the researchers had access to the complete weekly project records 
kept by the construction team. These project records were called Weekly Risk Reports (WRR), 
and included data on all cost and schedule deviations encountered during the project. 
Additionally, the closeout reports were collected from each project, which identified the final 
project cost and schedule duration. The root cause source of each change order was tracked 
within this documentation, such that an accurate record of how each cost and schedule impact 
was realized. For each project, the owner’s project manager and the contractor’s project 
manager each mutually agreed on the accuracy of the WRR and closeout report documentation 
for the project. 
Similar to numerous previous research, this study identified cost and schedule 
performance as the key project performance indicators. In this study, cost performance was 
measured in terms of cost overruns. Each project’s final WRR included total unexpected cost 
increases due to the risks involved. Further, risks were classified depending on their root cause. 
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In these projects, the root causes of the risks were important project participants—namely, the 
owner, contractor, and designer. Hence, risks were categorized under four major root causes: 
owner, contractor, designer, and unforeseen factors. The final WRR included the total dollar 
increase as well as the dollar increase due to the four categories of risks. Similarly, the final 
WRR identified the total number of days the project was delayed due to each category of risk. 
This information was used to measure a project’s schedule performance. 
In addition to measuring cost and schedule performance, this study also measured 
contractor performance, in terms of owner satisfaction. For most of the projects, the owner rated 
the contractor in the project closeout report after the construction was completed. The owner 
rated contractor performance in terms of cost, schedule, quality, professionalism, responsiveness, 
risks, rules, and satisfaction. The average of the above satisfaction rates was adopted for analysis 
in this study. 
4.6 Dependent Variables 
 
In this research, the measures of project performance were dependent variables. These 
measures included the cost and schedule deviations tracked by the owner during the construction 
phase, as well as the satisfaction ratings the owners assigned at the end of construction. 
4.6.1 Cost Growth 
 
A project is said to have a cost growth if the final cost exceeds the awarded cost. The cost 
growth is the difference between the final cost and the awarded cost. For this study, cost growth 
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4.6.2 Schedule Growth 
 
A schedule growth is calculated by determining the number of days that a project 
exceeded the awarded schedule (days). These delays were converted to percentages for this 
study, using the formula in Equation 2. 
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 
= 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 
 








As discussed earlier, the causes of these cost overruns and schedule growth were 
categorized according to their root causes. Table 4.6 shows the average performance of the 
projects, categorized by risk type. 
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Table 4.6: Average Cost and Schedule Performance 
 
Category % 
Cost performance  
Total cost growth 9.70% 
Owner-caused cost increases 6.42% 
Designer-caused cost increases 2.15% 
Contractor-caused cost increases 0.02% 
Unforeseen cost increases 1.10% 
Schedule performance  
Total schedule growth 36.53% 
Owner-caused schedule growth 25.42% 
Designer-caused schedule growth 5.09% 
Contractor-caused schedule growth 1.92% 
Unforeseen schedule growth 4.14% 
 
 
4.6.3 Owner Satisfaction Rate 
 
At the end of each project, the owner rated the contractors on a scale of 0%–100%. One 
limitation of the study is that only 84 projects (71.2%) included owner satisfaction ratings. 
4.7 BV Premium 
 
The term BV premium was devised to refer to the total cost of BV procurement. The BV 
premium is calculated by determining the difference between the awarded cost and lowest bid 
submitted at the time of project award. A percentage is calculated through using the formula in 




𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (%) = 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ($) − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ($) 
 
 






4.7.1 Total BV Cost 
 
The sum of the BV premium and cost growth is termed total BV cost. Cost growth is 
included in the total BV cost because owners would expect no cost impacts during construction 
because the owners are paying extra money upfront through using BV procurement. The total 
BV cost would be 0 in an ideal project, in which the lowest bidder is selected and no cost growth 
occurs during the project. The total BV cost can be compared with the cost growth of the low-bid 
alternative to identify any potential cost savings for the owner (see Figure 4.3). The total BV cost 




𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (%) = 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ($) + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ ($) 
























Figure 4.3: Conceptual Comparison between Low-Bid and BV Procurement Methods 
 
 
4.8 Method of Analysis 
 
Based on the research objectives, the data collected from 118 construction projects were 
analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistical methods. 
4.8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis can be used to summarize a data set and describe its characteristics 
in detail. In this study, descriptive statistics were used to calculate the mean, median, mode, 
maximum, minimum, and standard deviation for each variable. 
To address Research Objective 1, descriptive statistics were used to determine the cost 
implications of a BV-awarded contractor. As part of this analysis, the data were divided into two 
categories: (a) projects in which the BV premium was 0 (because the project was awarded to the 


















































also used to answer Research Objective 2 and 3. The overall performance of projects was 
analyzed descriptively to answer Research Objective 2. To answer Research Objective 3, project 
procurement data and project performance data were analyzed in conjunction. 
4.8.2 Inferential Analysis 
 
Inferential statistics were used to test the hypotheses. The statistical tests were selected 
after the data were tested for normality. The normality tests revealed that the data were not 
normally distributed. Hence, Spearman’s correlation and the Kruskal-Wallis H test were used to 
analyze the data inferentially. 
4.8.2.1 Spearman’s Correlation 
 
Spearman’s correlation is used to measure the type and strength of an association 
between two variables. To analyze the data using this test, the following assumptions were 
considered: 
● Assumption 1: The two variables tested should be continuous. 
 
● Assumption 2: The two variables tested should represent paired observations. 
 
● Assumption 3: A monotonic relation should exist between the two variables. 
 
In this test, the strength of the relationship between the variables is measured using the 
magnitude; the direction is determined using the sign of the correlation coefficient. A correlation 
coefficient below 0.35 is usually considered a weak correlation, 0.36–0.67 is a moderate 
correlation, and above 0.67 is a strong correlation (Taylor 1990). 
In this study, Spearman’s correlation was used to determine the relationship between the 
qualifications of the awarded contractor and the contractor’s performance, as measured at the end 
of the project. The evaluation criteria used during procurement were considered as one of the 
variables, and project performance was the other variable. 
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4.8.2.2 Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test is a nonparametric test that can be considered as an alternative 
to the parametric ANOVA. The Kruskal-Wallis H test is used to find statistically significant 
differences in the medians of two or more groups of a variable. In order to perform this test, the 
following assumptions were considered. 
● Assumption 1: One of the dependent variables should be continuous. 
 
● Assumption 2: One independent variable should consist of two or more 
categorical, independent groups. 
● Assumption 3: There should be an independence of observations for the groups. 
 
● Assumption 4: All groups’ distributions of scores should have the same shape. 
 
For this study, the Kruskal-Wallis H test was used to find the differences in the contractor 
group’s performance in relation to the contractors’ qualifications. The contractors were grouped 
into three equal categories based on their qualifications. For the evaluation criteria of technical 
proposals and past performance, each group consisted of 39–40 contractors, as shown in Table 














Technical evaluation 39 40 39 
Past performance 39 40 39 
Interviews 22 22 21 
 
 
A similar analysis was performed regarding the projects in which a non-low bidder was awarded 
the contract; the purpose of the analysis was to identify the performance of the contractors who 
were paid the BV premium. The group divisions are shown in Table 4.8. 
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Technical evaluation 21 22 21  
Past performance 21 22 21  
Interviews 11 11 11  
 
 
These groups were compared to identify any differences that exists between them at a 
95% level of confidence (p = 0.05). To test the hypothesis statements, the median evaluation 
scores of the contractor groups were compared using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. 
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This chapter is organized into four main sections, which align with the study’s research 
objectives and research question. The first section reports the BV premium values; the premium 
is a measure of the cost implications that BV procurement carries for owners. This section also 
contains qualifications-based characteristics of the awarded contractors. The second section 
identifies the project performance results of BV-procured construction projects, measured in 
terms of cost growth, schedule growth, and owner satisfaction with contractor performance. The 
third section reports on the total BV cost of the projects. This section is somewhat a culmination 
of the preceding sections in that the total BV cost is the sum of the BV premium and construction 
phase cost growth. This section also explores the sources of cost growth, with particular 
emphasis on non-owner-caused cost growth. The fourth section explores whether there are 
relationships between awarded contractors’ qualifications and performance during the 
construction phase. 
5.2 BV Premium: Cost Implications of BV Procurement 
 
Because owners selected non-lowest bidders in the majority of the projects, it was 
important to quantify the magnitude of the BV premium that owners paid. The BV premium 
results are summarized in Table 5.1. On average, owners selected a contractor that was 7.12% 
more expensive than the lowest bid. The median BV premium of 0.96% was much lower than 
the mean, indicating the data set was somewhat skewed. This finding is logical because, by 
definition, the BV premium has a lower bound of 0% (when the awarded contractor is also the 
lowest bidder). Conversely, there is no upper bound, and the 90.93% value of the maximum BV 
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premium identified in the data set indicates that owners are willing to select a significantly more 
expensive contractor in certain circumstances. 
Table 5.1: BV Premium Statistics 
 





Std. dev. 13.29 
 
 
5.2.1 Characteristics of Awarded Contractors 
 
The characteristics of awarded bidders were investigated through examining various 
aspects of the cost and qualifications proposals. First, the upfront cost implications of BV- 
procured D-B-B projects were investigated by identifying how often the owner selected the 
lowest bidder. As shown in Figure 5.1, the lowest bidder was awarded the contract in 44.9% of 
the projects. These results are important because it is generally perceived that BV procurement 
results in greater upfront costs. The study findings indicate that the lowest bidder is selected in 
nearly half of all cases. In the remainder of cases, the owner’s evaluation team determined that a 




Figure 5.1: Frequency of the Lowest Bidder Being Awarded the Project 
 
 
The statistical analysis shows that the owners selected the lowest bidder less often than 
they selected a higher bidder. The lowest bidder was awarded in 53 of the projects; in the 
remaining 65 projects, a non-lowest bidder was awarded the contract. 
The results also indicate that owners did not always award the contract to the best- 
qualified contractor. A cumulative score was calculated using the evaluation scores and their 
respective evaluation weights in each project. The awarded contractor was the best qualified 
in 72.9% of the projects. It should be noted that an average of 4.3 bidders competed for each 
















Projects with the Lowest Bidder as Awarded Contractor 

































Figure 5.2: Qualification Levels of Awarded Contractors 
 
 
The analysis indicates that owners typically selected contractors with bids between the 
lowest and average bids (see Table 5.2). The awarded bidder, on average, was 7.12% more 
expensive (median = 0.96%) than the lowest bidder. But compared to the average bid, the 
awarded bidder was 0.43% less expensive. 
Number of Projects Awarded to the Best Qualified Contractor 
Number of Projects Awarded to the Second-Best Qualified Contractor 
Number of Projects Awarded to the Third-Best Qualified Contractor 



























Table 5.2: Cost of Awarded Bid Compared to the Lowest and Average Bid per Project 
 
 Awarded vs. 
lowest bid (%) 
Awarded vs. 
average bid (%) 
Mean 7.12 ˗0.43 
Median 0.96 ˗0.58 
Mode 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 90.93 36.30 
Minimum 0.00 ˗27.66 
  Std. dev.  13.29  12.00  
 
 
5.3 Construction Phase Performance of BV-Procured Projects 
 
This section reports the statistical results regarding construction-phase performance in 
BV-procured D-B-B projects. To answer Research Objective 2, the construction-phase 
performance of BV-awarded contractors was evaluated across multiple performance indicators. 
These performance indicators—cost growth, schedule growth, and owner satisfaction—are 
discussed in the subsections below. 
Overall, the results show that most projects did experience cost growth and schedule 
growth during the construction phase. Across the data set, 88.1% of the projects experienced 
either cost overruns or schedule growth, as shown in Figure 5.3. Of those projects, 49.1% 




Figure 5.3: Summary of Construction Phase Cost and Schedule Performance 
 
 
5.3.1 Cost Growth and Schedule Growth 
 
The root causes of cost growth were documented in the closeout reports completed by the 
owners’ project managers. Table 5.3 summarizes the cost growth and schedule growth 
experienced during the construction phase. The average cost growth was 9.69%, the median cost 
growth was 5.3%, and the maximum cost growth was 133.3%. The average schedule growth was 
36.5%, the median schedule growth was 6.3%, and the maximum schedule growth was 317.1%. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Overall Cost and Schedule Performance 
 
 Overall cost growth 
(%) 
Overall schedule growth 
(%) 
Mean 9.69 36.53 
Median 5.19 6.02 
Mode 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 133.33 317.14 
Minimum ˗15.52 ˗24.56 
Std. dev. 18.98 63.67 
Projects without Cost Growth and Schedule Delay 
Projects with only Cost Growth 
Projects with only Schedule Delay 







Table 5.4 shows the significance of each root cause (owner, contractor, designer, and 
unforeseen) in terms of cost growth. The majority of cost growth was caused by the owner. 
Noncontractor cost growth accounted for virtually all cost growth: 9.67% of the 9.69% cost 
growth experienced (on average) in the projects. 
 
 














Mean 6.42 0.02 2.15 1.10 3.27 9.67 
Median 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 5.10 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 133.33 12.04 60.93 14.48 60.93 133.33 
Minimum −15.19 −5.24 −5.35 −0.58 −5.24 −14.83 
Std. dev. 18.35 1.28 7.18 2.42 7.67 19.33 
 
 
Schedule growth data is shown in Table 5.5. The results reveal that the owner was the 
cause of the majority of schedule growth. Noncontractor-caused growth represented the vast 




















Mean 25.42 1.92 5.09 4.14 11.11 34.61 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 317.14 53.33 88.24 105.26 132.61 317.14 
Minimum −4.20 −24.56 0.00 −12.61 −24.56 −16.81 




As shown in Table 5.6, approximately 66.3% of the cost growth and 69.6% of the 
schedule growth were owner related. Across the projects, owner-related cost growth and 
schedule growth averaged 6.4% and 25.4%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.6: Owner-Caused Cost Growth and Schedule Growth 
 
 Owner-related factors Other factors 
Cost growth 66.29% 33.71% 





The analysis results indicate that awarded contractors contributed minimally to project 
performance issues. 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show that the mean contractor-related cost growth and schedule 
growth were 0.02% and 1.92%, respectively. As shown in Table 5.7, only 0.21% of the cost 




Table 5.7: Contractor-Caused Cost Growth and Schedule Growth 
 
 Contractor factors Other factors 
Cost growth 0.21% 99.79% 




The results indicate that 22.16% of cost growth and 13.93% of schedule growth were due 
to design-related errors. The designers’ effect on cost growth and schedule growth is shown in 
Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8: Designer-Caused Cost Growth and Schedule Growth 
 
 Designer-related factors Other factors 
Cost growth 22.16% 77.83% 
Schedule growth 13.93% 86.06% 
 
 
5.3.1.4 Unforeseen Conditions 
 
Because the majority of the projects were renovations, it was important to consider 
unforeseen conditions that resulted in cost growth and schedule growth. Table 5.9 shows that 
11.34% of the cost growth and 11.33% of the schedule growth were the result of unforeseen 




Table 5.9: Unforeseen Conditions’ in Project Performance 
 




Cost growth 11.34% 88.66% 
Schedule growth 11.33% 88.67% 
 
 
5.3.2 Performance Differences between Low Bid and Non-Low-Bid Contractors 
 
The data were statistically analyzed to compare performance in projects with a BV 
premium (non-lowest-bidder award) and in projects without a BV premium (lowest-bidder 
award). Table 5.10 shows the differences in cost growth. The average cost growth in projects 
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with a BV premium outperformed the projects with no BV premium. The average cost growth of 


































No BV Premium (n = 53) 
Mean 7.75 0.23 3.48 0.70 4.41 11.93 12.16 
Median 0.47 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.88 4.77 5.27 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 133.33 12.04 60.93 7.21 60.93 133.33 133.33 
Minimum −15.19 −0.68 −5.35 0.00 −5.19 −14.83 −15.52 
Std. dev. 23.11 1.66 10.21 1.52 10.53 24.55 24.54 
BV Premium (n = 65) 
Mean 5.34 −0.15 1.08 1.42 2.35 7.84 7.69 
Median 0.52 0.00 0.09 0.28 1.40 5.10 5.11 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 72.87 0.76 7.82 14.48 14.48 72.87 72.87 
Minimum −0.45 −5.24 0.00 −0.58 −5.24 0.00 −5.24 




Table 5.11 shows similar results in terms of schedule growth. The projects with no BV 
premium performed better than the other projects. The average schedule growth in projects 
without a BV premium was 21.7%, with a median of 0.8%. For projects with a BV premium, the 
average and median schedule growth were 48.6% and 13.1%, respectively. 
 






























No BV Premium (n = 53) 
Mean 15.62 1.44 2.71 1.97 6.12 20.30 21.74 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 240.00 18.42 76.09 56.52 132.61 240.00 240.00 
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Minimum 0.00 −3.89 0.00 0.00 −3.89 0.00 −3.89 
Std. dev. 40.25 3.97 11.15 8.35 19.44 43.86 44.28 
BV Premium (n = 65) 
Mean 33.42 2.31 7.03 5.92 15.18 46.28 48.59 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.30 13.07 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 317.14 53.33 88.24 105.26 106.67 317.14 317.14 
Minimum −4.20 −24.56 0.00 −12.61 −24.56 −16.81 −24.56 
Std. dev. 63.93 9.73 16.37 18.21 28.00 71.80 74.08 
5.3.3 Owner Satisfaction 
 
The owners’ satisfaction with contractor performance was collected upon completion of 
the construction phase. Out of a possible satisfaction score of 100%, owners’ average satisfaction 
score was 95.23% (see Table 5.12). 
 
 
Table 5.12: Owner’s Satisfaction Scores 
 
 Maximum Minimum Mean Median Mode Std. dev. 
Satisfaction 100% 65% 95.23% 97.5% 100% 7.37% 
 
 
5.4 Total BV Cost 
 
The cost of the BV premium was combined with construction-phase cost growth to 
identify the total BV cost. On average, the total BV cost was 15.14% (with a median of 8.80%) 
above the lowest bid with no cost growth. The full results are shown in Table 5.13. 
 
 
Table 5.13: Total BV Cost Statistics 
 





Std. dev.  20.14  
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5.5 Linking Project Procurement Results with Construction-Phase Performance 
The results reveal that few statistically significant correlations exist between contractor 
qualifications (as assessed in the procurement stage by the owner’s evaluation committee) and 
project performance indicators. The statistically significant results of Spearman’s correlation are 
shown in Table 5.14. Contractors’ technical proposal scores and owners’ satisfaction were found 
to have a statistically significant correlation (rs = −0.217, p = 0.018). With a correlation 
coefficient of 0.189, contractors’ past performance and cost growth are statistically significant (p 





















Technical proposal Owner’s satisfaction 0.240 0.028 84 
Past performance Contractor’s cost growth 0.189 0.042 117 
Past performance Designer’s cost growth 0.208 0.024 117 
Past Performance Owner’s satisfaction 0.228 0.038 84 
Interview Contractor’s schedule growth −0.277 0.032 60 
Schedule Contractor’s cost growth 0.286 0.013 75 
Schedule Owner’s satisfaction −0.281 0.033 58 
 
 
5.6 Differences in Construction Phase Performance Based on Evaluation Scores of 
Contractor Groups 
5.6.1 Group Differences in All Projects 
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis H test identify the groups of contractor qualifications 
and project performance that have statistically significant differences. These combinations and 
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their overall statistical significance are shown in Table 5.15. Technical proposal scores have a 
statistically significant difference from owner schedule growth (p < 0.01), total schedule impact 
(p < 0.01), and owner’s satisfaction (p = 0.02). When past performance scores were tested in 
relation to designer cost growth and owner satisfaction, the pairs were found to be significant (p 
= 0.04 for designer cost growth and p = 0.05 for owner satisfaction). Additionally, contractor 
interview scores and schedule impacts have a statistically significant relationship (p = 0.05). 
 
Table 5.15: Statistically Significant Combinations of Qualifications and Performance 
Indicators 
Independent variable Dependent variable Overall significance (p) 
Technical proposal Owner schedule growth <0.01 
 Total schedule growth <0.01 
 Owner satisfaction 0.02 
Past performance Designer cost growth 0.04 
 Owner satisfaction 0.05 
Interview Contractor schedule growth 0.05 
 
 
Further, for all pairs that were identified as statistically significant, a pairwise comparison 
was conducted. For the pairs, the contractor groups with significant group differences are shown 
in Table 5.16. The contractor groups with high and moderate technical proposal scores have 
statistically significant differences regarding owner schedule growth at project completion. The 
group with high scores has a mean of 0.13 and a median of 0.0, whereas the moderately qualified 
group has a mean and median of 0.52 and 0.12, respectively. Groups with technical proposal 
scores that were moderate (owner schedule growth: mean = 0.52, median = 0.12) or low (owner 
schedule growth: mean = 0.13, median = 0.0) have significant group differences regarding owner 
schedule growth. The owners were highly satisfied with the groups with past performance scores 
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that were higher (owner satisfaction: mean = 0.97, median = 0.91) than with groups with past 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.6.2 Group Differences in Projects with a BV Premium 
 
The projects with a BV premium were analyzed to determine whether construction-phase 
performance differences exist based on groupings of contractor qualification scores. Table 5.17 
shows the results. The pair of technical proposal score and owner schedule impact (p = 0.01) and 
the pair of technical proposal score and total schedule impact (p = 0.01) were found to be 
statistically significant. No pairs involving past performance and interview scores were found to 
be statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 5.17: Statistically Significant Combinations of Qualifications and Performance 
Indicators of Contractor Groups for BV Premium Projects 
Independent variable Dependent variable Overall significance (p) 
Technical proposal Owner’s schedule impact 0.01 
 Total schedule impact 0.01 
 
 
Table 5.18 shows the contractor groups that have significant performance differences 
based on their qualification scores. The group of contractors with high technical proposal scores 
(total schedule growth: mean = 0.324, median = 0.054) and the group with moderate technical 
proposal scores (total schedule growth: mean = 0.893, median = 0.781) were found to have 
statistically significant group differences in total schedule impact, according to the Kruskal- 


























































































































































































































































































































The results of this study are important for the construction industry. The findings can 
assist construction owners and contractors in better understanding the BV procurement method. 
Owners can use these results to identify the most suitable contractor for future projects. 
Contractors can use the findings to better understand the evaluation criteria that owners use in 
BV procurement. The results are further discussed in this chapter. 
The study was successful in linking the project procurement phase to the project 
construction phase of vertical projects that were procured through the BV method and were 
delivered through D-B-B. This chapter summarizes the study’s findings and contributions. The 
chapter also describes the limitations of the study, along with recommendations for further 
research. 
6.2 Cost Implications of BV Procurement 
 
When considering numerous projects over time, the cost implications of BV procurement 
compared with low-bid procurement appear to be relatively minor. The median BV premium 
value of 0.96% indicates that owners who use BV as a program-wide policy may typically 
experience minor upfront costs of selecting non-low bidders. Furthermore, the results show that 
the awarded contractor is less expensive than the average bidder, which indicates that owners 
who use BV procurement receive overall cost benefits in the market. Additionally, in nearly 45% 
of cases, the lowest bidder was also selected as the BV option due to their strong qualifications. 
However, there are instances in which owners chose to select contractors that were 
substantially more expensive than the lowest bid option. Closer inspection of the project in 
which the BV premium value was 90.93% reveals several situational factors that might influence 
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the owner to select a significantly more expensive contractor. First, this project had only two 
bidders, which means the owner’s options were quite limited. Second, discussion with the 
owner’s evaluation team revealed that the lowest-bidding contractor was unfamiliar with (and 
potentially unqualified to address) the hazardous material aspects of the project, which resulted 
in extremely low scores from the evaluation committee. Finally, the project size was relatively 
small, with a budget of approximately $150,000; therefore, the large percent difference between 
the two bidders did not correspond with a large magnitude of cost impact to the owner. 
6.3 BV Project Performance 
 
When BV-procured projects are compared with data on low-bid projects, it appears that 
BV projects have a more favorable cost performance during the construction phase. McKim et al. 
(2000) observed a cost growth of 19.9% in 25 reconstruction projects, whereas cost growth for 
the BV projects in the current study was 9.69%. 
The BV projects can be considered to have performed exceptionally well if the owner- 
related causes of cost growth and schedule growth are omitted from the final project 
performance. Some researchers and industry experts at Design Build Institute of America argue 
that final project performance should not take into account the owner’s scope changes (Korman, 
R. 2016, Slowey, K. 2016). Changes in the owner’s requirements are one of the main reasons for 
change orders (Gunhan et al. 2007). In this study, after the owner factors were removed, the 
projects had a cost growth of 3.27% (see Table 5.4) and schedule growth of 11.11% (see Table 
5.5). These percentages can be deemed as indicating good performance, especially for renovation 
projects. 
Further, minimal cost growth and schedule growth were the result of contractor factors. 
Only 0.02% of cost growth and 1.92% of schedule growth were contractor related (see Table 5.4 
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and Table 5.5). Contractors were responsible for 0.21% and 5.25% of cost growth and schedule 
growth across all projects (see Table 5.7). These findings may indicate that BV can be an 
effective method for owners to use in order to achieve consistent contractor performance 
outcomes. 
The results suggest that the contractors in BV-premium projects were more effective in 
managing their costs than were contractors in no-BV-premium projects. Table 5.10 shows that 
the 65 projects with BV premiums experienced an average cost growth of 7.69%, whereas the 
average cost growth was 12.16% for the 53 projects with no BV premium. 
Awarded contractors in BV projects achieve strong performance in the areas of cost and 
schedule and receive high owner-satisfaction ratings. Of all the projects, 11.86% did not 
experience any cost growth or schedule growth (see Figure 5.3). According to Table 5.3, the 
average cost growth was 9.7% (median = 5.19%) and the average schedule growth was 36.53% 
(median = 6.02%). The average cost growth is much lower than the low-bid projects Pocock et 
al. (2000) studied. In that study, the average cost growth was 12.88% and the average schedule 
growth was 41.24%. Considering that 78% of the projects in the current study were renovation 
projects, the percentages prove that contractors accomplished their goals fairly well. 
6.4 Relationship between Contractor Qualifications and Project Performance 
 
The inferential testing identified relationships between (a) contractors receiving high 
qualification scores and (b) superior project performance during the construction phase. 
Contractor groups with better technical proposals were able to control the schedule better than 
were the other contractor groups and ultimately received better owner satisfaction rates (see 
Table 5.16). These findings support hypothesis statements H1.b and H1.c. The contractors with 
high qualification scores were able to achieve high performance because they identified potential 
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risks through project-specific planning. In some previous studies, such as by Lines and Kumar 
(2018) and Perrenoud et al. (2017), the contractors identified risks before contracts were 
awarded, leading to positive results at the end of the construction phase. Because the majority of 
the analyzed projects in this study were renovations, it was important to identify risks beforehand 
in order to achieve better performance. 
The contractors with high past-performance scores received better owner-satisfaction 
scores than did the other groups of contractors. This finding supports hypothesis statement H2.c. 
Owners were able to identify the contractors that had worked on projects similar to the proposed 
project by reviewing the contractors’ past performance. A contractor that had successfully 
worked on a similar project was more likely to handle similar risks without affecting the overall 
project performance. 
The results also suggest that the contractor group with better interview scores handled the 
project schedule better, as hypothesized in H3.b. This result was mainly due to the owner 
interacting with the project risk handlers, such as the project manager, site superintendent, and 
critical subcontractors before awarding the project. During this process, the owner identified the 
contractor most suitable for the project and, therefore, achieved better schedule performance. 
6.5 Summary of Findings 
 
The findings of this study can be summarized as follows: 
 
● Construction owners can potentially save money through using BV procurement 
rather than the low-bid method. 
● Projects with a BV premium have better cost performance than do projects 
without a BV premium. 
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● Contractors with better technical proposals, past performance, and interview 
scores tend to achieve superior performance during the construction phase. 
6.6 Contributions 
 
The study makes several contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, this study 
proposed a new metric—the BV premium—to quantify the cost implications of BV procurement 
relative to the low-bid method. This study also developed the concept of a total BV cost metric to 
determine the exact cost burden of the BV procurement method for owners. The BV premium 
and the BV cost metric are important because, even though previous studies have demonstrated 
that BV procurement results in superior construction-phase performance, owners should not 
ignore the BV premium that is paid to achieve the superior results. Finally, this study is the first 
to establish potential linkages between procurement-phase evaluations and the construction- 
phase performance of the awarded contractor. The findings further justify the conclusion that 
qualifications are a legitimate factor to consider during contractor procurement. 
6.7 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
A limitation of the study is that it was confined to project in the United States and 
Canada. Because the performance of a project is affected by the geographic location, the findings 
of this study may not be useful to owners and contractors outside of the United States and 
Canada. Another limitation is that owner satisfaction scores were available for only 84 of the 118 
projects. Further, this study did not consider differences between the monetary size of the 
projects. Other limitations may include the fact that the study is confined to D-B-B delivered 
vertical projects. 
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Future research could consist of performing the same analysis on horizontal projects, 
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Final Weekly Risk Report 
  May 12, 2011    












Client PM: Stuart McCormack  Overall Client PM Satisfaction: - 
Vendor: RCS Construction  # Unresolved Risks: 0 
Vendor PM: Nick Tingley  # Impacts to University Primary Functions: 0 






Notice to proceed date 
 
4/7/2015 
Total cost impacts $ 42,825 Original completion date 7/31/201 5 
Current project cost $881,825 Awarded project duration 116  
Percent cost impact 5.1% Total schedule impacts 57  
   Forecasted completion 
date 09/26/15 
   Percent delayed 49.1% 
Client change order rate +0.2% Client schedule impacts +0.0% 
Contractor change order rate +0.0% Contractor schedule impacts +4.3% 
Design change order rate +2.0% Design schedule impacts +30.2% 
Unforeseen change order rate +2.9% Unforeseen schedule impacts +14.7% 
Noncontractor CO rate 5.1% Noncontractor delay rate: +44.8% 
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Overall client impacts 4 $1,460 0 
Client: Scope change 3 $(188) 0 
Client: Contract/payment 0 — 0 
Client: Regulatory/codes/permits 1 $1,648 0 
Client: Other 0 $ - 0 
Overall contractor impacts 3 $ - 5 
Contractor: Error/omission/general issues 0 $ - 0 
Contractor: Sub/supplier issue 3 $ - 5 
Contractor: Innovation/efficiency 0 $ - 0 
Overall design impacts 9 $16,996 35 
Design: Error/omission in design 9 $16,996 35 
Overall unforeseen impacts 6 $24,369 17 
Unforeseen: Existing conditions 6 $24,369 17 
Unforeseen: Unforeseen events/weather 0 — 0 
 22 $42,825 57 
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TO BE COMPLETED BY THE CLIENT PROJECT MANAGER UPON PROJECT 
COMPLETION 
Please rate each of the criteria on a scale of 1 to 10 to the best of your knowledge, with 10 
representing that you were very satisfied (and would hire the firm/individual again) and 1 
representing that you were very unsatisfied (and would never hire the firm/individual again). 
If you do not have sufficient knowledge of past performance in a particular area, please leave 
it blank. 
 





# Criteria Unit Score 
1 Ability to manage costs (1–10)  
2 Ability to maintain schedules and respond to requests in a timely manner (1–10) 
 
3 Quality of work (1–10)  
4 Professionalism and ability to manage (1–10)  
 
5 
Ability to meet client expectations and 





6 Ability to identify, communicate, and mitigate risk (1–10) 
 
7 Ability to follow Client rules, regulations, and requirements (1–10) 
 
8 Overall customer satisfaction and   willingness to hire firm again  (1–10) 
 
 
Overall Average Close 





APPENDIX D—KRUSKAL-WALLIS H TEST RESULTS 
 
Independent variable Dependent variable Significance 
 Owner’s cost impacts 0.151 
 Contractor’s cost impacts 0.554 
 Designer’s cost impacts 0.404 
 Other cost impacts 0.860 
 Total cost impacts 0.183 
Technical proposal Owner’s schedule impacts 0.004 
 Contractor’s schedule impacts 0.584 
 Designer’s schedule impacts 0.496 
 Other schedule impacts 0.288 
 Total schedule impacts 0.003 
 Overall satisfaction of the owner 0.118 
 Owner’s cost impacts 0.998 
 Contractor’s cost impacts 0.148 
 Designer’s cost impacts 0.048 
 Other cost impacts 0.528 
 Total cost impacts 0.490 
Past performance Owner’s schedule impacts 0.066 
 Contractor’s schedule impacts 0.275 
 Designer’s schedule impacts 0.251 
 Other schedule impacts 0.179 
 Total schedule impacts 0.131 
 Overall satisfaction of the owner 0.050 
 Owner’s cost impacts 0.076 
 Contractor’s cost impacts 0.293 
 Designer’s cost impacts 0.932 
 Other cost impacts 0.330 
 Total cost impacts 0.647 
Interview Owner’s schedule impacts 0.632 
 Contractor’s schedule impacts 0.049 
 Designer’s schedule impacts 0.135 
 Other schedule impacts 0.699 
 Total schedule impacts 0.676 
 Overall satisfaction of the owner 0.079 
 
